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Abstract
In most previous studies of verbal probabilities, participants are asked to translate expressions such as possible and
not certain into numeric probability values. This probabilistic translation approach can be contrasted with a novel
which-outcome (WO) approach that focuses on the outcomes that people naturally associate with probability terms. The
WO approach has revealed that, when given bell-shaped distributions of quantitative outcomes, people tend to associate
certainty with minimum (unlikely) outcome magnitudes and possibility with (unlikely) maximal ones. The purpose of
the present paper is to test the factors that foster these effects and the conditions in which they apply. Experiment 1
showed that the association of probability term and outcome was related to the association of scalar modifiers (i.e., it
is certain that the battery will last at least..., it is possible that the battery will last up to...). Further, we tested whether
this pattern was dependent on the frequency (e.g., increasing vs. decreasing distribution) or the nature of the outcomes
presented (i.e., categorical vs. continuous). Results showed that despite being slightly affected by the shape of the
distribution, participants continue to prefer to associate possible with maximum outcomes and certain with minimum
outcomes. The final experiment provided a boundary condition to the effect, showing that it applies to verbal but not
numerical probabilities.
Keywords: probability, language, verbal, judgment.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, verbal probabilities have been examined
with a focus on their probabilistic meanings (e.g., a
chance means on average a 30% probability). This ven-
ture is labelled the Probabilistic Translation approach.
The present paper presents findings suggesting that this
approach should be supplemented with a pragmatic ap-
proach that focuses on the outcomes people expect to
be associated with a particular verbal expression (e.g., a
chance is typically used to describe a top outcome). We
have called this endeavour the Which Outcome (WO) ap-
proach.
When do people use verbal probability expressions
such as “it is possible” or “it is certain”, and what do they
mean? This question has traditionally been approached
with a focus on the numeric probabilities these terms are
conveying (e.g., Budescu & Wallsten, 1995; Clarke, Ruf-
fin, Hill & Beamen, 1992; Juanchich, Sirota & Butler,
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2013). In studies inspired by this probabilistic translation
approach participants are typically given a “How Likely”
task where they read a verbal probability qualifying a
specified outcome and are asked to assess the numeric
probability value the speaker has in mind. In other words,
the verbal expression is “translated” into a number. Fig-
ure 1 provides an example of a How Likely Task. The
translation approach has revealed that verbal probabili-
ties are numerically vague, as participants suggest num-
bers that vary considerably (Budescu & Wallsten, 1995;
Karelitz & Budescu, 2004). Despite this fuzziness, most
people will agree that possible generally corresponds to
a higher probability than unlikely, and that likely, highly
likely, and certain correspond to still higher probabilities.
This suggests a rough hierarchy of phrases that enables
verbal probabilities to successfully compete with numeric
probabilities as input to the decision process (Wallsten,
Budescu & Zwick, 1993). In the present paper special at-
tention will be paid to the expressions possible, certain,
and not certain. Translation studies agree that certain
indicates for most people probabilities close to 100%,
whereas not certain corresponds on average to probabil-
ities in the 40–50% range (Brun & Teigen, 1988; Reyna,
1981). This is also the probability range typically as-
signed to the term possible (Clarke et al., 1992; Theil,
2002).
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Figure 1: Examples of How Likely and Which Outcome
tasks (Teigen, Juanchich & Filkuková, in press).
Example of How Likely Task
“It is possible that the battery will last 2 hours”
What is the probability that the battery will last 2 hours?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Example of Which Outcome Task
A sample of computers of the brand “Comfor” were
tested to check how long the batteries last before they
need to be recharged. The figure below shows how many
batteries lasted how many hours. Please complete the
prediction below with the outcome that seems most ap-
propriate in this context.
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“It is possible that the battery will last .... hours”
Verbal phrases have also been studied from a more
pragmatic perspective, which has focused on an alterna-
tive feature of the meaning of probability terms, namely
their directionality (Gourdon & Beck, 2012; Honda &
Yamagishi, 2006; Teigen, 1988; Teigen & Brun, 1999;
for an attempt to reconcile the two approaches, see
Juanchich, Sirota, Karelitz & Villejoubert, 2012). Ex-
pressions with a positive directionality (such as a chance
and possible) draw attention toward the occurrence of an
outcome and are typically associated with reasons ex-
plaining why the outcome should happen (e.g., “It is pos-
sible that Blacky will win the race because he is in ex-
cellent shape”). In contrast, expressions with a nega-
tive directionality (such as not certain and unlikely) fo-
cus on the flip side of the coin and are typically associ-
ated with reasons supporting the non-occurrence of the
target outcome (e.g., “it is not certain that Blacky will
win because he was injured recently”). The directional-
ity of verbal probabilities allows complementary ways of
framing a probabilistic message, which can “leak” infor-
mation (to use an expression coined by Sher & McKen-
zie, 2006) about the speaker’s communicative intentions
(e.g., encouraging someone to bet on Blacky or not to bet
on Blacky). More generally, positive expressions are used
whenever a probability is compared to lower chances, for
instance, when an exaggerated probability statement has
to be corrected upward. By contrast, negative expressions
are used when a probability is compared to a higher one,
for instance, when a belief has to be adjusted downwards
(Juanchich, Teigen & Villejoubert, 2010).
In the present study, we approach the usage and mean-
ing of probability expressions from yet another pragmatic
perspective. Whereas the two previous approaches de-
scribe how verbal probabilities qualify an outcome, in
this approach we ask which outcomes do they qualify.
This approach was developed in a context of outcomes
that vary in terms of magnitude (Teigen & Filkuková,
2013; Teigen et al., in press; Teigen, Juanchich & Riege,
2013). For example, weather forecasters predict not only
the possibility or likelihood of rain but also how much
it will rain (e.g., “It is possible that it will rain 10mm”).
Similarly, doctors do not only predict the chances of re-
covery of a patient, but a likely recovery time (e.g., “The
patient will certainly recover in 10 weeks”). In studies
using the Which Outcome (WO) approach, participants
do not choose a numerical probability associated with the
verbal expression, but indicate the outcome suggested by
the verbal expression in an Outcome Completion Task.
For example, in a Battery life vignette, participants re-
ceived a unimodal, bell-shaped distribution of outcomes
showing the duration of a sample of laptop batteries (as
depicted in the lower panel of Figure 1), and were asked
how long a battery can last, or will possibly last (“It is
possible that a Comfor battery lasts for ... hours”). The
WO approach revealed patterns of association between
probability terms and outcome magnitude inconsistent
with the traditional probabilistic translation approach.
Typically, certain was often associated with minimum
outcomes, whereas can, possible, a chance, and not cer-
tain were all used to describe maximal outcomes (Teigen
et al., in press). For example, in the battery vignette,
where batteries lasted between 1 hour and 3.5 hours with
a peak located at 2 hours, most of the participants claimed
they were certain that the battery would last 1 hour and
judged that it was possible that the battery would last
3.5 hours. Note that these two values were infrequent
(5–10%) and should accordingly have been perceived as
quite unlikely.
These findings were replicated in several studies,
showing that people have strong associations between
probability terms and outcome magnitudes that are not
consistent with previous studies of probability terms’ nu-
merical meanings. Indeed, participants selected rare out-
comes, which had a frequency of 5-10%, to complete
statements about possible and certain outcomes, despite
the fact that possible and certain are believed to convey
probabilities around 50% and 90% respectively. Thus,
when the meanings of verbal probability phrases are ex-
plored withwhich outcome (in this case: howmuch) ques-
tions, the results can differ considerably from those ob-
tained by the conventional how likely approach, leading
to HL-WO discrepancies.
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The present article investigates the conditions in which
participants infer the intensity of an outcome from a prob-
ability term and aims to gain a better understanding of
the dynamics that underpin the Which Outcome (WO)
findings. A series of five studies aims to test the occur-
rence of the WO findings with different scalar modifiers,
different outcome distributions (e.g., magnitude distribu-
tions of different shapes, categorical distributions) and
to new formats (numerical probabilities). These studies
contribute to the mapping of factors that are responsible
for the WO effects.
1.1 At least or at most quantities?
The discrepancy between the probabilistic translation and
Which Outcome approaches may be explained by the way
participants construe the different tasks. Teigen et al.
(2013) suggested that in the How Likely task (i.e., where
participants provide a numerical probability to translate
the meaning of a verbal probability) participants adopt a
probabilistic reading of the task. In contrast, when they
are asked to make a prediction, it appears that partici-
pants rely more heavily on pragmatic rules of communi-
cation of quantities that depart from a frequentistic uncer-
tainty interpretation. When conveying quantities in nat-
ural language, it is common practice to report the min-
imum quantity expected. For example, a person saying
that a crop will give 100 kg of potatoes may in fact make
the prediction that the crop will give at least a 100 kg
of potatoes. Jou, Shanteau and Harris (1996) and Man-
del (2001) made the same suggestion that certain pre-
dictions are interpreted as communicating the minimum
outcome to be expected in the context of framing stud-
ies (e.g., “If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die”
would be understood as “If Program C is adopted, at least
400 people will die”). In fact it seems that the associa-
tion between quantities and scalar modifiers (Nouwen &
Geurts, 2007) may be more generalised and complex than
expected: certain predictions could be associated with “at
least” quantities, whereas predictions conveying different
degrees of certainty would be associated with other scalar
modifiers. So for instance, predictions of possible out-
comes could be given “at most” readings, as suggested
by a recent study by Teigen et al. (in press).
Teigen and Filkuková (2013; study 4) tested this possi-
bility for the modal auxiliaries will and can, and showed
that participants associated will (close to certain) with the
modifier “at least”, whereas can (a modal with similar
meaning to possible) was more often combined with the
modifier “up to”. A Norwegian corpus search showed
the same conclusion: will was often associated with the
scalar modifier “at least”, whereas can was often asso-
ciated with the modifier “up to”. Experiment 1 was de-
signed to test whether the verbal probability terms certain
and possible are also linked to such scalar modifiers indi-
cating extremity.
1.2 Extremeness or uniqueness?
With the novel Which Outcome approach we found that
extreme outcomes were more often selected than could
be expected from an analysis based on the frequencies
of occurrence. For example participants selected a bat-
tery duration of 3.5 hours (frequency of 5%) to be pos-
sible whereas possible is usually considered to convey
a 50% probability (Teigen et al., in press). Moreover,
maximum extremes were selected more often than mini-
mal ones, especially for outcomes with scalar properties
where higher values entail the occurrence of lower ones
(e.g., before lasting 3 hours, a battery lasted 1.5 hours).
Participants thus preferred outcomes that were extreme,
but also unique; which of these two factors drives the
preference so far remains unclear.
The preference for extreme outcomes is supported by
the cognitive psychology literature showing that extreme
probabilities are judged as more informative than mod-
erate ones (Keren & Teigen, 2001), and by the social
psychology literature showing that information about ex-
treme cases (e.g., extreme personality traits) has a greater
impact than less extreme ones (Fiske, 1980). However, all
outcome distributions studied so far (Teigen & Filkuková,
2013; Teigen et al., in press; Teigen et al., 2013) were
bell-shaped and approximately symmetrical (see bottom
of Figure 1), making extreme outcomes at the same time
more infrequent than intermediate outcomes. Hence,
we do not know whether people selected maximum out-
comes because of their extremeness or their uniqueness—
or conversely, whether a higher frequency would make
extreme outcomes even more attractive, and perhaps in-
crease the choice of bottom values. Experiments 2 and 3
were designed to replicate and extend the original find-
ings of the WO effect for outcome distributions that are
monotonically increasing or decreasing (Experiment 2)
or U-shaped with a mode located either to the bottom or
to the maximum of the distribution (Experiment 3).
1.3 Ruling out outcome extremeness with
categorical outcomes
Which Outcome studies have so far been conducted with
outcomes that can be ordered on a magnitude scale from
low to high (e.g., short to long battery duration) where it
makes sense to ask “how much?”. However, one can also
ask participants to choose a possible or an uncertain out-
come among a set of discrete categorical outcomes that
differ only in frequency. For instance, if a car is ran-
domly selected from a collection where 5% of the cars
are white, 10% red, 20% grey, and 65% black—what is a
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possible colour of the car? Which colour is not certain?
There are in this case no top or bottom outcome values,
as the colours can be arranged in any order, so the WO
effect might seem to not apply. However, relative proba-
bility could be used as an alternative cue, suggesting that
the most frequent alternative (black) should be mentioned
most frequently as a possible colour, whereas the least
frequent should be chosen for the certain colour. If in-
stead uniqueness plays a role, more participants should
select white than red or grey. Similarly, all outcomes
in this example are, by definition, not certain. But is
this primarily a characteristic that people will use to de-
scribe the most frequent or the least frequent alternative,
or will they choose among those in between? In Experi-
ment 4, the quantitative how much-question is replaced
with a more general which outcome-question to ascer-
tain whether, even under these circumstances, people are
prompted to make choices that deviate from those sug-
gested by the quantitative translation approach.
1.4 Is the Which Outcome (WO) effect lim-
ited to verbal probabilities?
The WO effect was demonstrated with modals (i.e., will
and can; Teigen & Filkuková, 2013) and with positive
and negative probability terms (e.g., a chance and not cer-
tain; Teigen et al., in press; Teigen et al., 2013). In their
concluding comments, Teigen et al., (in press) speculated
that the effect observed so far with linguistic materials
might be extended to uncertainty communication in gen-
eral. This hypothesis entails that the WO effect could be
observed with numerical probabilities as well. In agree-
ment with this possibility, results of Sirota and Juanchich
(2012) show that even numerical probabilities can be in-
terpreted as pragmatic devices to soften bad news, an in-
terpretation that was previously believed to be limited
to verbal probabilities (Bonnefon & Villejoubert, 2006;
Juanchich, Sirota & Butler, 2012). Yet other pieces of
evidence support that verbal probabilities are more influ-
enced by pragmatic considerations. For example, Winds-
chitl andWells (1996) posited that verbal probabilities are
governed by associative processes (and thus more sensi-
tive to contextual influences), whereas numerical proba-
bilities are more rule based.
In Experiment 4 we asked the WO-questions based on
numerical rather than verbal probabilities. Participants
were asked which outcome is most appropriate to com-
plete a statement such as “There is around a 10% [50%;
90%] chance that a battery of the brand Comfor will last
for . . . .. hours”. A literal interpretation of a 10% prob-
ability would require that the lowest outcome in the dis-
tribution is selected (which occurs in exactly 10% of the
cases), whereas the WO effect suggests answers in the
high end of the distribution, as these are most often cho-
sen in the verbal probability studies as examples of an
“unlikely” outcome. As numerical probabilities encour-
age an analytic, mathematical mode of thinking, rather
than a pragmatic approach, this could be a boundary test
of the WO effect under circumstances not in its favour.
2 Experiment 1
Teigen and Filkuková (2013) showed that the completion
of can and will sentences (e.g., a battery can last for ...
hours) were related to specific scalar modifiers (i.e., up to
and at least). The completion of sentences with a differ-
ent outcome in the Which Outcome task may be based on
a different perception of the questions. For example, peo-
ple asked to complete the certain sentence may think that
it is about providing the minimum outcome that could
occur, the larger outcome entailing this one. On the other
hand, possible, as can, could be interpreted as a question
focusing on the maximal outcome that could occur.
2.1 Method
In a pre-test designed for the present studies, two
classes of Norwegian undergraduate psychology students
(N = 43) were asked to estimate the probabilities speak-
ers would have in mind when saying “It is possible1
[certain2; not certain3] that the laptop battery will last 3
hours” (along with six other verbal expressions). In this
context, which comes close to the vignettes used below,
possible was given a mean probability value of 52.6%
(SD = 17.9), certain received a mean score of 92.1%
(SD = 14.7), and not certain a mean score of 48.1%
(SD = 20.1).
Participants. A total of 50 participants from Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk completed the web questionnaire
(Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chan-
dler & Ipeirotis, 2010). The sample included 40%
females and had a mean age of 33.18 years (18-65,
SD = 12.80). Most participants were White Caucasian
(88%) and had a higher education (86%).
Materials and Procedure. Participants read vignettes
describing the frequency of outcome magnitudes, for ex-
ample different battery durations (in hours) or different
weight loss (in pounds) after following a diet. In each
vignette the frequency distribution of the outcome mag-
nitudes was presented as a bell shaped bar chart similar
to the one depicted in Figure 1.
1Norwegian: “mulig”
2Norwegian: ”sikkert”
3Norwegian: ”ikke sikkert”
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Table 1: Choices (percentages) of modifiers to complete statements about three different products based on two differ-
ent verbal probabilities (It is certain and It is possible), Experiment 1.
It is certain It is possible
At least Up to Around Exactly At least Up to Around Exactly
Battery 78.7 6.4 14.9 0.0 4.3 72.3 19.1 4.3
Diet 74.5 10.6 14.9 0.0 6.3 72.9 18.8 2.1
Jeans 76.7 7.0 16.3 0.0 9.1 79.5 11.4 0.0
We used the vignettes Computer battery, Jeans shrink-
age, and Diet developed by Teigen and Filkuková (2013).
Only the vignette Diet was adapted by providing a uni-
modal and bell shaped bar chart instead of a table. Partic-
ipants read the vignettes presented on different pages and
in a single order. The vignettes featured a certain and a
possible sentence to be completed, presented on the same
page and in a randomised order.
The completion of the sentence was done by a drag
and drop process, from a box containing four modifiers:
at least, exactly, about, and up to, and the five numerical
outcomes described in the distribution of outcomes. The
completion instructions read as follows: Please, complete
each sentence below with the number that seems most
natural in this context. You may also add one of the sug-
gested words (at least, around, exactly or up to) if you
feel this could improve the sentence.
For example, in the Battery vignette, participants were
asked to complete the following sentence: “it is certain
that the battery will last _ _ _ _ _ _ _ hours”, after read-
ing a distribution of battery durations ranging from 1.5 to
3.5 hours by increments of 0.5 hour. The drag and drop
completion task featured the following list organised in a
column and always presented in this order: at least, ex-
actly, around, up to, 1.5 hours, 2 hours, 2.5 hours, 3 hours,
3.5 hours. The material is available in Appendix A.
2.2 Results
Outcome value selection. Between 76% and 80% of
the participants completed the certain sentence with the
minimum outcome value, whereas between 73% and
77% chose a maximum value to describe a possible out-
come. As each scenario contained different ranges of nu-
merical outcomes (e.g., in the battery scenario, the range
was 1.5-3.5 hours, while in the diet scenario it was 10-
18 pounds), we recoded in each case the lowest value as
1, the second lowest as 2, and so on. Therefore, an out-
come of 3 represents the middle value, which was also
the peak of the distribution and its most likely outcome
value, whereas scores of 1 and 5 represent the bottom
and top tail outcomes, respectively. Mean scores close to
5 indicate that participants chose outcomes towards the
upper end of the distribution, while a mean score closer
to 1 indicates choices towards the lower end of the distri-
bution.
We ran a 3 x 2 within-subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on the recoded scores with scenario (battery,
diet, and jeans) and probability term (certain and pos-
sible) as within-participants factors. The ANOVA in-
dicated no main effect of the scenario, F(2,94) = 1.26,
p = .290, but a main effect of the probability term,
F(1,47) = 146.85, p < .001, 2p = .78. Participants com-
pleted the sentences with certain more often with val-
ues towards the lower end of the distribution (M = 1.59,
SD = 1.06), and the sentences with possible more of-
ten with values towards the upper end of the distribu-
tion (M = 4.40, SD = 0.97). Finally, there was no in-
teraction between the scenario and the verbal probability,
F(1,47) < 1, p = .586 (lower bound adjustment).
Modifier selection. Participants provided modifiers for
most of the vignettes (in 88% to 98% of the cases). Cases
where participants provided a combination of modifiers
were excluded (e.g., around up to; at least around up to).
As indicated in Table 1, participants completed the cer-
tain statement with a modifier stressing the lower bound
of an interval (i.e., at least), showing that participants in-
terpret the certain sentence completion as indicating the
minimum outcome that can occur in the future. In con-
trast, participants completed possible with a majority of
modifiers describing the upper bound of an interval (i.e.,
up to).
We ran analyses of frequencies to investigate the ef-
fect of verbal probability and vignette on scalar modifier
selection. The analyses showed only an effect of verbal
probability. When the verbal probability was certain, the
sentence was more often completed with the modifier at
least (70% of choices accross scenarios), but when it was
possible, it was more often completed with up to (69% of
choices across scenarios). The effect of the verbal proba-
bility was significant in all of the three scenarios (respec-
tively in the Battery, Jeans, and Diet vignettes: 2(4, N =
100) = 59.63, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .77; 2(3, N = 100)
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Figure 2: Examples of distributions of outcomes that are monotonically increasing and decreasing (Experiment 2) or
U-shaped with mode to the right or to the left (Experiment 3).
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= 50.09, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .71; 2(4, N = 100) =
50.90, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .71). There was no effect
of the scenario when the verbal probability was certain
(2(6, N = 150) = 3.42, p = .755, Cramer’s V = .11) or
when it was possible (2(8, N = 150) = 6.44, p = .598,
Cramer’s V = .15).
These results replicate the effect of verbal probability
on outcome selection shown by Teigen et al. (in press), in-
dicating that certainty was associated with unlikely small
outcomes (frequency of 5%) whereas possible was asso-
ciated with equally unlikely maximum outcomes. The
present results further show that the pattern of outcome
association is related to the perception of an implicit spe-
cific modifier. Certainty is associated with lower bound
range modifier (at least) whereas possible was most often
associated with higher bound range modifier (up to).
3 Experiment 2
When people are asked to select a certain outcome from a
unimodal, bell-shaped distribution of outcomes (see Fig-
ure 1) they often choose the lowest one, or alternatively,
the most frequent middle score. As shown in Experi-
ment 1, when they are asked to pick a possible outcome
they regularly choose the highest value (Teigen et al., in
press), despite the fact that outcomes in both tails of the
distribution are infrequent and hence quite unlikely. The
present experiment was designed to investigate whether
this phenomenon could be replicated with monotonic dis-
tributions. In monotonically increasing distributions the
lowest score is least frequent, whereas the highest score is
most frequent. In contrast, in a monotonically decreasing
distribution the lowest value is the most frequent, whereas
the highest value is least frequent as illustrated by the dis-
tributions in the top panel of Figure 2. If extremeness is a
decisive factor, people will continue to describe low val-
ues as certain and high values as possible, regardless of
the shape of the distribution. If, on the other hand, out-
come frequencies are important then the response pattern
might change. So for instance, if the phrase “it is pos-
sible” suggests a low probability, participants should be
more inclined to select an outcome in the lower than in
the upper end of the distribution like the one depicted in
the left panel of Figure 2. Conversely, if “certain” is in-
fluenced by outcome frequency, they might switch their
outcome preferences from low and middle to high values.
3.1 Method
Participants. Students following an introductory class
at the University of Tromsø, Norway served as partici-
pants; N = 59 (89.8% female, 2 did not report gender;
median age 20 years). They were randomly assigned to
one of two conditions, one with decreasing and the other
with increasing distributions.
Design, Materials and Procedure. All partici-
pants read four vignettes previously used by Teigen and
Filkuková (2013) and Teigen et al. (in press). Two of
these high values were associated with positive outcomes
(duration of computer batteries and weight reduction with
a diet product), and two with negative outcomes (jeans
that shrink when washed and letters that are delayed in
mail). The Battery, Diet, Jeans, and Mail vignettes were
presented in this order, each accompanied with frequency
information about the occurrence of different values in a
sample of outcomes, either displayed as graphical distri-
butions (as in the top panel of Figure 2) or in a tabular
format. All participants completed two statements for
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Table 2: What will certainly and what will possibly happen? Choices (percentages) of low, intermediate, and high
numbers in statements about four different products based on monotonically increasing and decreasing distributions,
Experiment 2.
Ascending distributions Descending distributions
Vignettes Low Interm. High Low Interm. High
It is certain
Battery 86:2 6:9 6:9 96:4 3:6 :
Diet 89:7 6:9 3:4 100 : :
Jeans 93:1 : 6:9 96:4 : 3:6
Mail 48:1 7:4 44:4 67:9 7:1 25:0
Total 79:3 5:3 15:4 90:2 2:7 7:1
It is possible
Battery 10:6 3:3 86:7 : 7:1 92:9
Diet 6:7 3:3 90:0 : 3:4 96:6
Jeans 6:7 : 93:3 : 3:4 96:6
Mail 46:7 13:3 40:0 20:7 10:3 69:0
Total 17:7 5:0 77:5 5:2 6:1 88:8
each vignette, one containing the term certain and an-
other with the term possible, (e.g., “it is possible [certain]
that the battery will last for .... hours”). Half of the par-
ticipants received the statements with possible before the
certain statements, and the other half completed the state-
ments in the reverse order.
Half of the participants read distributions of outcomes
that were monotonically increasing, with the lowest value
as the least frequent one and the highest value as the
mode, and the other half read decreasing distributions
that dovetailed the increasing version. The vignettes and
their associated distributions are presented in Appendix
B. This study therefore featured a 4 x 2 x 2 mixed de-
sign, with the four vignettes and the two probability terms
within-subjects and the shape of the distribution between-
subjects.
3.2 Results
Responses from all vignettes were coded in three cate-
gories as low (minimum outcome), high (maximum out-
come) and intermediate (all scores in between). Results
displayed in Table 2 show that most participants preferred
to describe a certain outcome with the bottom value of the
distribution and a possible outcome with the maximum
value of the distribution, both for ascending and descend-
ing distributions. For example, about 90% of the partic-
ipants judged that it was certain that the battery would
last 1.5 hours, whereas a similar percentage judged that it
was possible that it would last 3.5 hours, given a distribu-
tion in which a sample of batteries lasted from 1.5 to 3.5
hours.
A mixed-design variance analysis was conducted, to
test the effect of the verbal probability, distribution and
vignette on outcome selection. The analysis showed that
verbal probability had an effect on outcome selection
(F(1, 52) = 254.44, p < .001 , ²p = .83). The vignette
did not produce a main effect (F(3, 156) < 1), nor an
interaction with the distribution shape (F(3, 156) < 1).
Vignette was interacting with verbal probability (F(3,
156) = 22.90, p < .001 , ²p = .31). This interaction is
due to mail vignette where participants did not select the
same outcomes as in the other vignettes. The deviant re-
sponse pattern of this vignette has been previously ob-
served (Teigen et al., in press) and was presumed to be
caused by the fact that the outcome dimension in this vi-
gnette is bi-directional. Indeed the time it takes for a letter
to go from Norway to the United-States can be construed
in terms of quickness or in terms of delay, therefore cre-
ating a bimodal preference for either the fastest delivery
(i.e., minimum outcome value) or the longest delay (i.e.,
maximal outcome).
A closer inspection of the results displayed in Table 2
reveals that the association between certain and minimum
outcomes and between possible and maximum outcomes
are slightly stronger for descending than for ascending
distributions, leading to a statistically significant inter-
action between distribution shape and probability term
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(F(1, 52) = 6.10, p = .017 , ²p = .10). However, the gen-
eral conclusion to be drawn from these patterns of results
is that the tendency to describe low values as certain and
high values as possible is not uniquely dependent upon
one particular distribution of outcomes.
These results support the view that preference for max-
imum outcomes to describe possibility is not determined
by their frequency of occurrence. If possible was asso-
ciated with rare outcomes, like in the previous studies,
we would have expected a shift of responses toward the
low end of the distribution in the ascending series. How-
ever, participants continued to select maximal values as
the possible ones, even when they were also most fre-
quent. This preference was weaker in the mail context,
which has an ambiguous underlying dimension, where
both lowest values (i.e., how fast the mail takes) and high-
est values (i.e., how long it takes) can be perceived as top
achievements (for ambiguous dimensions, see Teigen et
al., in press, Study 3). The valence of the outcome de-
scribed did not appear to modify participants’ preferences
for outcome magnitude.
Participants in the present experiment associated cer-
tainty almost exclusively with the lowest value, regard-
less of its frequency. Even in the ascending distribu-
tion the maximum value was rarely selected, although it
was the most frequent outcome of the distribution. This
pattern is more conspicuous in the present results than
for the bell-shaped distributions used previously and con-
trasts sharply with predictions based on the probabilistic
translation approach, where the most probable outcome
would also be expected to be the most certain. How-
ever, the present results are compatible with a directional,
scalar interpretation of numerical magnitudes where low
outcomes are entailed by higher ones. For outcomes or-
dered on such a scale it makes sense to say that a battery
of this brand will certainly last for at least 1.5 hours (and
probably longer) because before lasting 3 hours, a battery
has indeed lasted for 1.5 hours.
4 Experiment 3
Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants associate
certain with the lowest outcome and possible with the
highest outcome in a monotonically increasing or de-
creasing distribution, replicating earlier findings based
on unimodal symmetrical distributions (Teigen et al., in
press). In Experiment 2, extreme outcomes were ei-
ther the least or the most frequent, thus implying fre-
quency extremeness. The rarity, or conversely, the high
frequency of occurrence of the outcome may have con-
tributed to steer participants in selecting these outcomes,
as both low and high extreme likelihoods are more infor-
mative than middle ones (Keren & Teigen, 2001). Ex-
periment 3 was designed to replicate these findings us-
ing bimodal, U-shaped distributions as shown in the bot-
tom panel of Figure 2, where the middle outcomes are the
least frequent.
Moreover, in Experiment 2, statements about what
is certain and what is possible were completed by the
same participants. This might have contributed to po-
larizing participants’ assessment of these two terms, in
line with findings suggesting that people tend to exagger-
ate the difference between concepts they are asked about
in a joint presentation format, compared with their as-
sessment of the same concepts presented on separate oc-
casions (Schwarz, 1999). To control for this effect, in
the present experiment assessments of certain and pos-
sible outcomes were performed separately in a between-
subjects design. Finally, to avoid a potential influence of
outcome valence, one presumably neutral “nonsense” or
“utility free” vignette was included in the set, replacing
the ambiguous Mail vignette.
4.1 Method
Participants. Psychology students from the University
of Birmingham (UK) took part in this experiment in ex-
change for course credits, N = 102 (81.1% females, me-
dian age: 19 years). Participants were randomly allocated
to four different conditions.
Design, Materials and Procedure. In a 2 (Probability
term) x 2 (Mode location) x 4 (Vignette) mixed design,
participants read the Battery, Jeans, and Diet vignettes
previously used (see Vignettes 1-3 in Appendix B) and
the new Shmulp (utility free) vignette (described as Vi-
gnette 5 in Appendix B). The utility free vignette was
composed with fantasy outcomes in a non-existing con-
text. This vignette aimed to test whether the reference for
minimum or maximal outcomes was derived from infor-
mation about the utility of the outcomes. If this was the
case, the preference for minimum or maximal outcome
should not be observed in this vignette. The probability
term and the mode location of the distribution were ma-
nipulated in between-subjects.
In each vignette the distribution of outcome values was
presented by means of a bar chart featuring a U-shape
with two peaks, the highest being located either to the left
or to the right (as in the bottom panel of Figure 2). In all
vignettes participants were asked to complete one state-
ment describing either a “possible” or “certain” value
(e.g., “it is possible that the battery will last ... hours”).
4.2 Results
For each vignette, answers more than 3 standard devia-
tions from the mean were discarded. This left 95 partici-
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Table 3: What will certainly and what will possibly happen? Choices (percentages) of low, intermediate, and high
numbers in statements about four different products, for U distributions with the mode located either on the left or on
the right (N=95), Experiment 3.
Mode on the left Mode on the right
Vignettes Low Interm. High Low Interm. High
It is certain
Battery 90.5 9.5 -- 69.6 4.3 26.1
Diet 61.9 14.3 23.8 78.3 8.7 13.0
Jeans 81.0 19.0 -- 56.5 17.4 26.1
Shmulps 76.2 14.3 9.5 60.9 8.7 30.4
Total 77.4 14.3 8.3 66.3 9.8 23.9
It is possible
Battery 40.0 4.0 56.0 11.5 -- 88.5
Diet 44.0 4.0 52.0 7.7 -- 92.3
Jeans 32.0 16.0 52.0 3.8 3.8 92.3
Shmulps 40.0 4.0 56.0 7.7 3.8 88.5
Total 39.0 7.0 54.0 7.7 1.9 90.4
pants with answers in each scenario, to be taken into ac-
count in the analysis. Remaining values were recoded as
low, intermediate, and high, as in previous experiments.
Answers outside the distribution range, if not outliers,
were recoded as either low or high values (3 in the battery
vignette, 4 in the diet vignette, 3 in the jeans vignette, and
11 in the Shmulp vignette).
Results displayed in Table 3 show that most of the par-
ticipants preferred describing certain outcomes with the
bottom values of the distributions. However this trend
was more pronounced when the mode of the distribution
was low (on the left) than when it was high (on the right).
For example, 92% of the participants judged that it was
certain that the battery would last 1.5 hours, given a dis-
tribution in which the mode was 1.5 hours, whereas 67%
judged that it was certain that it would last 1.5 hour, given
a distribution in which the mode was 3.5 hours.
In contrast, most of the participants described possible
outcomes with the maximum value of the distribution.
Again, this trend was more pronounced when the mode
of the distribution was high (on the right) than when it
was low (on the left). For example, 89% of participants
judged that it was possible that the battery would last 3.5
hours, given a distribution in which the mode was 3.5
hours, whereas 54% judged that it was possible that it
would last 3.5 hours, given a distribution in which the
mode was 1.5 hours.
For the purpose of the analysis of variance, low an-
swers were given a value of 1, intermediate answers re-
ceived a value of 2 and high answers were given a value
of 3. The main and combined effects of the probability
terms (i.e., possible vs. certain) and of the mode location
(i.e., left vs. right) on outcome preferences were tested by
a 4 (vignette) x 2 (verbal probability) x 2 (distribution)
mixed design variance analysis.
Overall, the vignettes had no effect on the magnitude
of the answer, (F(3, 273) < 1, p = .358; lower bound
adjustment). The analysis revealed a main effect of the
location of the modal value on the outcome preference
(F(1, 91) = 12.86, p = .001 , ²p = .12) and a main ef-
fect of the probability term on the outcome magnitude
(F(1, 91) = 63.20, p < .001 , ²p = .41). The analy-
sis did not reveal an interaction between the probabil-
ity term and the location of the modal value or between
the probability term and the vignette (respectively, F(1,
91) = 2.43, p = .122 and F(3, 273) < 1, p = .564 ). There
was no significant interaction between the location of the
modal value and the vignette (F(3, 273) = 2.32, p = .076,
² p = .03). There was an interaction between the prob-
ability term, the location of the modal value and the vi-
gnette (F(3, 273) = 4.36, p = .005, ² p = .05). This in-
teraction may illustrate that in the certain Diet vignette
the preference for the minimal outcome was reinforced
when the mode was on the right whereas in all the other
vignettes this preference was reinforced when the mode
was on the left.
These results replicate the WO effect, showing that
participants associate certainty with the minimum out-
come and possibility with the maximum one. It is worth
noting that this finding holds even when possible was not
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contrasted with certain in a within-subject design such as
in Study 2. Moreover, the effect seems not to be utility
dependent as it also was found in the Shmulp vignette,
which describes a non-existent entity with nonsense out-
come values (Shmulps can have different numbers of
Glomps). In the Shmulp context it is hence difficult to
claim that extreme outcomes are preferred because they
are considered more (or less) useful than middle ones.
Finally, results based on the U-shaped distributions sug-
gest that the preference for extreme outcome values is not
caused by the shape of the distribution, although partic-
ipants preferred the extremes that were also most likely.
This applies both to certain and possible. Bottom out-
comes are more certain when they are frequent, and sim-
ilarly, maximum outcomes are more possible when they
are also the most frequent ones.
5 Experiment 4
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 confirmed previous findings
(Teigen et al., in press) that people typically complete
possible statements with extreme outcome values, and
disregard outcomes in the middle range. Moreover, re-
sults indicate that extreme outcomes were selected to
qualify possible or certain irrespective of whether those
outcomes were the least, the most or only moderately
likely. Building on these findings, we can assume that
the extremeness of the outcomes in itself may be partly
responsible for the preference for maximal and minimal
outcome in the outcome completion task. To test the role
of outcome quantitative extremeness the next experiment
features outcomes that cannot be ordered on a quantita-
tive dimension.
In Experiment 4 participants were presented with fre-
quency distributions of multiple categorical outcomes
(e.g., the distribution of red, black, white, and grey cars),
which cannot be ordered according to magnitude. For ex-
ample, a black car cannot be ranked as surpassing cars of
a different colour, and does not imply the previous occur-
rence of a red one in the same way that a battery lasting
3.5 hours implied that the battery has also lasted for 1.5
hour. In categorical outcome distributions, it makes less
sense to speak of maximum or minimum scores, and the
concept of outcome extremeness is not applicable, unless
redefined. This could be obtained by ordering categories
from least to most frequent, or the other way around, from
common to rare.
Three verbal probabilities will be examined here: It
is possible, it is entirely possible and it is not certain.
If possible is still associated with “maximum scores”, it
would now be expected to be used to characterize either
the most frequent or the least frequent category, as op-
posed to the intermediate ones. The emphatic expression
entirelymight be expected to magnify the tendency to as-
sociate possiblewith a highly probable outcome, but from
a conversational perspective, entirely could rather call at-
tention to the occurrence of a relatively improbable out-
come. Finally, the phrase not certain is, by definition, ap-
plicable to all outcomes that have a probability of occur-
rence below 1.0. However, for magnitude distributions,
Teigen et al. (in press) found that not certain statements
were primarily associated with maximum or middle out-
comes, rather than low ones. In other words, not certain
differs from possible by being applicable to intermediate
values, but was similar in the sense that high extremes
were preferred to minimum scores. For categorical out-
comes, as in the present study, it remains an open ques-
tion whether not certain will be associated with the most
frequent category, the least frequent category (which both
can be regarded as “top” scores, albeit on different dimen-
sions) or categories in the intermediate range.
The verbal probability certain was not used here as the
at least interpretation does not apply to categorical vari-
ables, and none of the outcome categories were compre-
hensive enough to be regarded as certain. Participants
would accordingly feel that the task of picking a certain
outcome to be a meaningless one. In contrast, all cate-
gories with a non-zero probability of occurrence would
in principle be possible as well as not certain.
5.1 Method
Participants. Students from the University of Birming-
ham (UK) took part in the experiment on the internet in
exchange for course credits, N = 98 (89.8% females, me-
dian age: 19 years). Participants were randomly allocated
to three conditions with 32-34 participants in each.
Design, Materials and Procedure. The participants
read four vignettes presented in randomized order, and
for each vignette they completed a statement starting with
either “it is possible that . . . ”, “it is entirely possible that
. . . ” or “it is not completely certain that . . . ”. Partici-
pants completed the statement with the categorical out-
come they judged most appropriate.
Each vignette described 3 to 4 categorical outcomes
with occurrence frequencies in percentages. For example
in the car vignette participants read that Jason has won a
car and that he is wondering about the car colour. Jason
is then informed that among the cars to be won 5% are
white, 10 % red, 20% grey, and 65% black. The order
of the categorical outcomes was counterbalanced so half
of the participants read the frequencies presented in an
increasing order (e.g., 5% to 65%) and the other half in
a decreasing order (e.g., 65% to 5%). The order of pre-
sentation of the outcomes was based on their frequency,
either decreasing or increasing to prevent participants to
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Table 4: Percentages of participants choosing the least frequent, moderately frequent or most frequent category to
describe a possible, an entirely possible or a not certain outcome, Experiment 4.
Possible (n = 32) Entirely possible (n = 34) Not certain (n = 32)
Vignettes Least Mod. Most Least Mod. Most Least Mod. Most
Car 12.5 3.1 84.4 32.4 2.9 64.7 40.6 9.4 50.0
Supervision 3.1 3.1 93.8 20.6 0.0 79.4 34.4 18.8 46.9
Transport 9.4 12.5 78.1 14.7 2.9 82.4 34.4 0.0 65.6
Shmulp 15.6 3.1 81.3 32.4 5.9 61.8 37.5 6.3 56.3
Total 10.2 5.5 84.4 25.0 2.9 72.1 36.7 8.6 54.7
infer an outcome preference based on their order of pre-
sentation. The order of presentation did not affect the par-
ticipants’ preferences and will not be discussed further.
In addition to the car vignette described above, two
vignettes illustrated real life situations (Supervision and
Transport) and the final vignette used a nonsense con-
text (Shmulps). In the Supervision vignette a teacher is
wondering whether she would tutor a student attending
program A (10%), B (20%), or C (70%). In the Trans-
port vignette a man is guessing whether his wife would
go to work the next day by car, bus, or bike. Finally, in
the Shmulp vignette, participants read that shmulps are of
three kinds: gelering (10%), laurding (20%) or glimpsing
(70%). The vignette was introduced as follows: Please
read the following vignette; don’t worry if you do not un-
derstand the meaning of some words. Try to complete the
statement with the expression that sounds most appropri-
ate given the context. The complete set of vignettes is
presented in Appendix C.
5.2 Results and Discussion
Choice distributions are presented in Table 4. The car
vignette (Car) involved a choice among four options.
For this vignette, the selections of the two “moderately
frequent” categories were pooled together. The three
other vignettes involved a choice between three cate-
gories (e.g., students from programme A, B, or C in the
Supervision vignette). In the table, the categories are or-
dered according to size from least to most frequent.
As depicted in Table 4, most participants completed
the statements with the most frequent outcome across
all the conditions and vignettes (from 46.9% to 93.8%).
Nevertheless, some participants chose the least frequent
outcome to describe a possible outcome (10.15%). This
preference was magnified by the more colloquial en-
tirely possible statement, for which one participant in four
chose the least frequent outcome. It was speculated that
this more emphatic expression would fit a conversational
context where it is important to announce that this out-
come, despite its rareness, should not be overlooked. Fi-
nally, more than one in three participants chose the least
likely outcome to describe a not certain outcome.
Overall, only around 5% of the participants chose the
intermediate outcome, even if the frequency of this out-
come (20-30%) should be within the range of probabili-
ties corresponding to not certain and possible, according
to probabilistic translation studies (Brun & Teigen, 1988).
The main and interaction effects of the probability
terms (i.e., possible, entirely possible, not certain) and
of the vignettes on outcome choices were tested with a
mixed-design variance analysis. The order of presenta-
tion of the categorical outcome (i.e., increasing vs. de-
creasing order) was also included as an independent vari-
able. The tests of between-subjects effects revealed a
main effect of the probability term on the outcome pref-
erence, F(2, 92) = 6.07, p = .003 , ²p = .12. The order
of presentation of the categorical outcome did not affect
participants’ preference, (F(1, 92) < 1), nor did it inter-
act with the probability term (F(2, 92) < 1). The proba-
bility term and the vignette did not interact significantly
(F(6, 276) = 1.88, p = .085 , ²p = .04). There was also
a main effect of the vignette on the outcome choice, F(3,
276) = 17.49, p < .001 , ²p = .16. This was related to a
stronger preference for the most frequent outcome in the
supervision and the transport vignettes.
Participants appear to have avoided moderately fre-
quent outcomes and preferred the least and most frequent
ones. Most of the participants chose to describe possible,
entirely possible and not certain statements with the most
likely categorical outcome. In the present vignettes, these
outcomes were assigned frequencies of 60-70%, which is
somewhat higher than the probabilities (around 40-50%)
suggested to correspond to possible by participants in
translation studies, but not incompatible with these val-
ues. However, intermediate outcomes were almost never
mentioned as possible, despite being assigned frequen-
cies of 20-30%, which are about equally close to typical
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Table 5: Choices (percentages) of low, intermediate and high outcome values for predictions featuring a 10%, 50% or
90% probability, Experiment 5.
Around 10% (n = 30) Around 50% (n = 32) Around 90% (n = 31)
Vignettes Low Inter. High Low Inter. High Low Inter. High
Battery 66.7 20.0 13.3 – 96.9 3.1 9.7 87.1 3.2
Diet 21.4 32.1 46.4 – 93.3 6.7 35.5 54.8 9.7
Jeans 53.3 13.3 33.3 6.3 87.5 6.3 13.3 86.7 –
Mail 13.3 6.7 80.0 9.4 90.6 – 9.7 63.4 26.9
Total 38.7 18.0 43.2 3.9 92.1 4.0 17.1 73.0 9.9
numeric translations of possible. In contrast, a larger pro-
portion of individuals felt drawn toward the least likely
outcome, which had an occurrence frequency of only 5-
10%. For not certain the least likely outcome was chosen
even more frequently. This could be explained by differ-
ent membership functions for negative than for positive
probability expressions (Budescu, Karelitz & Wallsten,
2003), but even the membership approach would find it
difficult to explain the absence of intermediate outcomes,
as membership curves are consistently drawn as single-
peaked (cf. Dhami & Wallsten, 2005, Figure 3).
6 Experiment 5
This study aimed to test whether the results of the new ap-
proach also applied to numerical probabilities or whether
numerical probabilities were associated with outcomes
according to strict quantitative rules. We studied which of
the outcome values taken from a bell-shaped distribution
participants associated with three numerical probability
magnitudes: around 10%, around 50%, and around 90%.
The term “around” was used to relax impossible proba-
bilistic constraints (e.g., associating a 50% probability to
a 40% probable outcome).
Based on the new approach findings, we expect low
and moderate probabilities (10% and 50%) to be associ-
ated with maximum outcome values (in agreement with
low and moderate verbal phrases, such as unlikely, a
chance, and possible), whereas 90% could be expected
to suggest minimum values (like certain). On the other
hand, the probabilistic translation approach predicts that
low probabilities will be associated with extreme out-
come values (e.g., low or high), whereas 50% and 90%
probabilities will be associated with intermediate values
that are also the most frequent.
6.1 Method
Participants. Altogether 94 participants were re-
cruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (53.6% fe-
male; median age: 30 years, age range: 18-63 years).
Most of the participants were in work (69.2%) and had
higher education experience (83.6%). Three participants
did not report their socio-demographic characteristics and
two participants reported an impossible age (2 and 4 years
old), which was considered a typo (or a joke). Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to three different numeri-
cal probability conditions (around 10%, around 50%, and
around 90%). Participants with extreme scores (more
than 3 standard deviations away from the mean) were ex-
cluded, resulting in n = 32, n = 30, and n = 31 in Condi-
tions 10%, 50%, and 90%, respectively.
Questionnaires. All participants completed a brief
web-questionnaire composed of the four vignettes (Bat-
tery, Diet, Jeans, and Mail) used in Experiment 2, but
with the original bell shaped outcome distributions shown
in Figure 1. In each vignette participants read and com-
pleted a numerical uncertainty statement (e.g., “there is
around a 10% chance that a battery of the brand Com-
for will last ... hours”). The vignettes were presented in
a randomized order on separate web pages. The uncer-
tain outcome was described with a probability of “around
10%”, “around 50%” and “around 90%” in three different
versions of the questionnaire.
6.2 Results
Outcome values chosen by participants were recoded as
low, intermediate and high values as in Experiments 1
and 2. The distributions of choices for each probability
condition are shown in Table 5.
The outcome values associated with a 10% chance
were mostly taken from the low and high tails of the dis-
tribution. For example, the 10% chance of battery dura-
tion was most often associated with the minimum battery
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duration (67%), in agreement with the distribution per-
centages (in this vignette, the minimum score was ob-
tained by 10%, whereas the maximum score was only
achieved by 5% of the batteries). For the other vignettes,
both maximum scores and bottom scores were obtained
by 1/10 of the samples. In the Jeans vignette participants
preferred the lowest value, whereas they associated a 10%
chance with the highest values to describe weight loss fol-
lowing a diet, or the time a letter from Norway takes to ar-
rive in the US. A large majority of the participants judged
that a 50% chance and a 90% chance best characterised
an intermediate value (92.9% and 80.0% respectively).
For example a computer battery had a 90% chance to last
2.5 hours given that such batteries were previously found
to last between 1.5 and 3.5 hours. Yet it is interesting to
note that altogether, 27% of participants chose one of the
(rare) extreme outcomes to describe a 90% chance. Of
these, 63.3% chose the minimum outcome, in line with
the HowMuch effect observed for certain in the previous
studies. Numerical probability magnitude had an effect
on the outcome chosen in all the four vignettes (respec-
tively in the Battery, Diet, Jeans, and Mail vignettes: ²
(4, N = 93) = 50.89, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .52; ²
(4, N = 89) = 33.31, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .43; ²
(4, N = 92) = 48.40, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .51; ² (4,
N = 93) = 69.80, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .61).
Overall, participants’ choices of outcome values were
quite consistent with a literal interpretation of numeri-
cal probabilities and appeared not to be affected by the
WO effect. These results suggest that numeric and ver-
bal probabilities are pragmatically different in the sense
that verbal expressions corresponding to a moderate de-
gree of certainty (possible, not certain) are typically as-
sociated with the maximum extreme values, whereas a
corresponding numerical probability (50%) is associated
with outcomes in the middle range. A high verbal prob-
ability (certain) can be given an at least interpretation,
and hence be associated with low outcome values. The
present results suggest that this makes less sense for a
high probability expressed in numbers (90%).
7 General discussion
In studies conducted within the Which Outcome (WO)
approach, participants are typically provided with a fre-
quency distribution of outcomes (e.g., computer batter-
ies which last between 1.5 and 3.5 hours) and asked to
complete a verbal statement with the outcome value that
sounds most appropriate (“It is possible that a computer
battery will last ___ hours”). This question format re-
vealed several WO-effects featuring (1) a preference for
selecting outcomes in the tails of an outcome distribu-
tion, (2) a preference for low end values to describe cer-
tain outcomes and outcomes that will happen, and (3)
a preference of high end values for unlikely and uncer-
tain outcomes, possible outcomes, outcomes that have a
chance of happening, or outcomes that can occur (Teigen
& Filkuková, 2013; Teigen et al, in press; Teigen et
al., 2013). The objective of the present paper was to
study the robustness of these effects and to test their lim-
its with various distribution shapes, outcome types, and
with numeric rather than verbal expressions of probabil-
ity, thereby improving our understanding of the pragmat-
ics of communication about uncertain events.
Results of five studies informed and specified the WO
approach on four points.
First, the preference for a specific outcome goes to-
gether with the preference for a scalar modifier. Possi-
ble predictions are likely to be associated with the mod-
ifier “up to” and with a maximal outcome, whereas cer-
tain predictions are most often associated with the mod-
ifier “at least” and with a minimum outcome (Experi-
ment 1). Secondly, a preference for extreme outcomes
was not limited to symmetrical distributions. This find-
ing indicates that extremes were not preferred because
of their uniqueness; on the contrary, results from Experi-
ment 2 and 3 show that extremes that were frequent were
chosen more often than less frequent extremes. Thirdly,
disregard for intermediate values could also be observed
in a set of categorical outcomes (Experiment 4), where
the most and the least frequent category were chosen
more often than categories in the middle. Finally, the
WO effects characteristic of verbal probabilities cannot
be extended to uncertainty communication in general as
a study conducted with numerical probabilities (Experi-
ment 5) found that they are given literal (mathematical)
rather than pragmatic interpretations.
7.1 Predictions and modifiers
Findings of Experiment 1 provided evidence that the term
possible was often associated with predictions of maxi-
mum outcomes and was therefore often associated with
a scalar modifier indicating an upper interval bound (i.e.,
up to). Certainwas often associated with a minimum out-
come that had a low frequency of occurrence and was as-
sociated with a scalar modifier indicating a lower interval
bound (i.e., at least). Interestingly, very few participants
chose to use the term exactly (0-6%), although they were
provided the frequentistic information that is deemed to
be sufficient to make accurate predictions. These re-
sults mirror well the findings of Teigen and Filkuková
(2013) with the terms can and will, as findings with pos-
sible and certain were very similar to findings with can
and will, respectively. Further research should use the
Which Outcome method to test the pattern of associa-
tion of modifiers and outcomes with other verbal prob-
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abilities (e.g., a chance, it is uncertain) and attempt to
draw some regularities in people’s preferences. For ex-
ample, further research could test whether the pattern of
association between verbal probabilities and modifier de-
pends on the average degree of certainty believed to be
conveyed by the probability term: low or medium prob-
abilities (e.g., can, possible) could be more often associ-
ated with maximum outcome modifiers (i.e., up to) and
very high degrees of certainty (e.g., will, certain) are as-
sociated with minimum outcome modifiers (i.e., at least).
These findings could have strong implications for pre-
diction studies where a medium probability of an out-
come occurrence is expected to convey the same infor-
mation than the medium probability of the outcome non-
occurrence. For example, in framing studies, the pre-
diction “If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die”
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) was originally assumed to
be logically equivalent to “If Program A is adopted, 200
people will be saved” given a set of 600 people. Yet,
participants may instead consider that saving at least 200
people is not the same as having at least 400 people dy-
ing. The non-equivalence between the different readings
of the predictions was hypothesised by Mandel (2001),
who showed that a complete description of the different
outcomes (e.g., 200 are saved and 400 die) cancels the
framing effect. Our present findings suggest that the at
least interpretation would also hold for descriptions in-
volving certainty, for instance “If Program A is adopted,
200 people will be saved for sure”.
7.2 Preference for extreme outcomes
When describing an outcome magnitude, participants
chose maximum values to describe possible outcomes
and minimum values for certain outcomes (Teigen et al.,
in press). These results hold even when the maximum
value was the most likely and the bottom value the least
likely. In Experiment 2, almost 90% of the participants
chose to associate certain with the least likely outcome
in apparent disregard of the quantitative meaning of what
it takes to be certain. For example, in the computer bat-
tery vignette, participants read that the battery could last
from 1.5 to 3.5 hours, and that only 10 batteries out of the
100 tested lasted 1.5 hours. The WO effects also held in
a between-subject design, where participants completed
possible or certain statements with outcome values from
skewed U-shaped distributions (Experiment 3). Also in
this case, participants chose to complete certain state-
ments with low scores and possible statements with high
scores, particularly when these scores belonged to the
most frequent group of outcomes.
7.3 Preferences for large and small cate-
gories
When outcomes belonged to qualitatively different cate-
gories (e.g., car colours), magnitude extremeness could
not be used as a cue for choosing which outcome was
not certain or possible. In this case, most participants se-
lected categories most closely matching the probabilistic
meaning of the probability term, choosing for example
the most frequent outcome as the one believed to be (en-
tirely) possible and not certain. Yet, the least frequent
category was also selected by a substantial minority, who
apparently felt this category more appealing than the in-
termediate categories (which were almost never selected).
This result suggests that some participants selected an
outcome only based on its rarity. Rare events have in
many contexts a special appeal, as testified by the old
adage “praeclara sunt rara” (the extraordinary is rare),
and by modern studies of the scarcity principle in con-
sumer psychology (Ditto & Jemmott, 1989; Lynn, 1991).
7.4 The new approach does not apply to nu-
merical probabilities
No WO effect was found with numerical probabili-
ties, which appeared to be given a frequentist inter-
pretation; participants chose the outcome whose occur-
rence matched most closely the probability communi-
cated. Participants did not consider that a 90% probabil-
ity should be associated with the minimum outcome, or
that a 10% probability should be reserved for maximum
values. Instead, 10% was used by a majority to describe
the low tail of the distribution in the Battery and Jeans
vignettes, which had exactly a 10% frequency of occur-
rence, whereas values from the high tail of the distribu-
tion were preferred in the Diet and Mail vignettes. Inter-
estingly, these vignettes gave the outcome distributions in
tabular form as whole numbers (1 of 10) rather than per-
centages (10%), which could have made the probability
matching strategy less salient.
Numerical probabilities appear here to have the advan-
tage of not being subject to contextual (pragmatic) con-
siderations that affect the interpretation of verbal prob-
abilities. This result is in line with the suggestions and
findings of Windschitl and Wells (1996) who proposed
that numerical probabilities elicit rule based strategies
whereas verbal probabilities rely more on associative pro-
cesses.
This does not exclude however, that under some cir-
cumstances, verbal probabilities could be interpreted
more in line with quantitative expectations. Possibly, pre-
senting distributions of probabilities instead of frequen-
cies could elicit a use of verbal probabilities consistent
with their probabilistic meaning. For example, when
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knowing that a computer has a 10% chance to last 1.5
hours, participants could be less likely to say that this per-
formance is certain than when based on frequency distri-
butions.
7.5 Two interpretations of verbal probabil-
ities
When people are asked to translate verbal expressions
into numerical probabilities, in accordance with the “how
likely” approach, possible and not certain outcomes are
expected to be placed close to the midpoint of the prob-
ability scale. In the pre-test reported in the introduction,
only one participant suggested that possible could mean
a 10% probability, and only three participants translated
not certain with 10% or less. However, in a context of
“which outcome” questions, we have seen that outcomes
with a 10% probability are frequently selected as repre-
sentative of possible as well as not certain events.
These results demonstrate that standard numerical
“translations” (obtained by the How Likely approach) of
verbal probabilities are not applicable to all contexts. One
possible source of the discrepancy between the results of
the How Likely and a Which Outcome task could be that
participants given the “how likely” question have a di-
chotomous outcome space in mind consisting only of the
focal outcome and its complement (a battery lasting or
not lasting in 3 hours), whereas those who are given the
“which outcome” or “how much” questions are consider-
ing multiple outcomes.
One may suggest that the WO findings are caused by
a specific design of the tasks. For example, participants
were not given the opportunity to choose a 100% certain
outcome, as the most frequent outcome had only around
a 50% chance of occurring. Participants, finding no al-
ternative that by itself could be regarded as a certain out-
come, may have chosen to redefine the task as a question
about minimum outcomes. According to this interpreta-
tion the WO effect would merely be the result of compli-
ance with the response format, which forced participants
to voice certainty in a situation where none of the out-
comes is actually certain to occur.
However, several arguments can be marshalled against
this view. First, if participants were reluctant to breach
the probabilistic interpretation of verbal probabilities,
they could choose one of the most likely outcomes (closer
to 100%) instead of an unlikely bottom value. Note
that participants associated the most likely outcome to
a 90% numerical probability, suggesting that they were
able to choose the outcome that best fitted a likelihood
value. Second, the consistent preference for low val-
ues rather than high ones suggests substantial agreement
about which values can be considered certain, as opposed
to those that are more appropriately labelled possible. Fi-
nally, WO effects are also demonstrated for possible and
in previous studies even for phrases like there is a chance
or it is unlikely (Teigen et al., in press). These findings in-
dicate that WO effects also occur where several outcome
frequencies match the numerical meanings of the expres-
sions and where people have the opportunity to select out-
comes more consistent with the HL approach. The scope
and robustness of the WO phenomena indicate that they
cannot be dismissed as a purely methodological artefact.
Instead, the WO phenomenon appears to rely on strong
conversational habits.
7.6 Applied implications
Findings of the new approach highlight that risk and un-
certainty communication is a process that is even more
complex than expected.
Investigations applying the traditional probabilistic
translation approach to verbal probabilities using “How
Likely” methods have unveiled many potential risk com-
munication problems. The recurrent between-subjects
variability of the probability associated to different terms
(e.g., Budescu &Wallsten, 1995) and their contextual de-
pendence (e.g., Harris & Corner, 2011; Juanchich et al.,
2012) represents two important and still unresolved chal-
lenges. On top of this complexity, we now know that
a forecaster may say that “it is certain that it will rain
2mm tomorrow”, despite knowing that this exact amount
of precipitation is in fact unlikely. It is well known in lin-
guistics that numerals are not always given an “exactly”
interpretation, but that “at least” and “at most” readings
are also possible (Levinson, 2000; Musolino, 2004). It is
for instance acceptable to say: “John has three children,
perhaps four”, indicating that the first mentioned number
can be considered true even if he has four children. The
present research adds to this analysis by showing that cer-
tain is particularly suited to suggest an “at least” interpre-
tation of scalar quantities. Compare the predictions A and
B.
(A) Tomorrow we will have 2mm of rain.
(B) Tomorrow we will certainly have 2mm of rain.
Both forecasts A and B are ambiguous in the sense that
they can mean that 2mm of rain is the most likely amount
of precipitation, or that the expected amount is at least
2mm of precipitation (and most likely more). Our results
suggest that the “at least” interpretation is more compati-
ble with statement (B) than with statement (A).
Yet, misunderstandings will arise if the recipient of
statement (B) expects that for certain it will rain just a
little, instead of inferring that this will be the minimum
amount. The gap between the pragmatic (e.g., certain as-
sociated with a 10% probable outcome) and probabilistic
treatment of verbal probabilities (e.g., certain associated
with a 90% probable outcome) indicates that a decision
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based on such uncertainty expression may be ill informed
and requires risk communication intervention.
Risk communication guidelines should take into ac-
count the actual usage of verbal probabilities, their prag-
matic meanings, in addition to their probabilistic mean-
ings, or at least try to disentangle the two. Results of
Study 4 suggest that numerical probabilities are given
a more literal interpretation than corresponding verbal
expressions, indicating that ambiguity can be reduced
when verbal probabilities are reported in conjunction
with numerical ones. This combination has been shown
to effectively reduce the interpersonal variability in the
probabilistic meaning of verbal probabilities (Budescu,
Broomell & Por, 2009; Budescu, Por & Broomell, 2011).
The benefits of the numerical and verbal association
might stem from the fact that numbers dampen the prag-
matic interpretation and reinforce the probabilistic one.
If verbal probabilities are reported one should perhaps
avoid the terms certain and possible in a context of mag-
nitudes. Certain is problematic because it may be unclear
whether the associated outcome value should be given an
“exact” or an “at least” reading, as discussed above. Pos-
sible is problematic because, in principle, it can be used
about all values with a non-zero probability, whereas in
practice it will be used primarily about the highest one,
regardless of frequency. It is accordingly not very infor-
mative about the probabilities involved. However, when
both of these terms are used together (like in Experiment
1) they may be useful for capturing a speaker’s ideas
about the range of outcomes as an alternative to confi-
dence intervals, or worst case—best case estimates.
References
Bonnefon, J. F., & Villejoubert, G. (2006). Tactful, or
doubtful? Expectations of politeness explain the sever-
ity bias in the interpretation of probability phrases.
Psychological Science, 17, 747–751. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01776.x
Brun, W., & Teigen, K. H. (1988). Verbal probabilities:
Ambiguous, context-dependent, or both? Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 41,
390–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(88)
90036-2
Budescu, D. V., Broomell, S. B., & Por, H. H. (2009). Im-
proving communication of uncertainty in the reports of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Psy-
chological Science, 20, 299–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02284.x
Budescu, D. V., Karelitz, T. M., & Wallsten, T. S. (2003).
Predicting the directionality of probability words from
their membership functions. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 16, 159–180. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1002/bdm.440
Budescu, D. V., Por, H .H., & Broomell, S. B. (2012).
Effective communication of uncertainty in the IPCC
reports. Climatic change, 113, 181–200. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s10584-011-0330-3
Budescu, D. V., & Wallsten, T. S. (1995). Processing lin-
guistic probabilities: General principles and empirical
evidence. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation,
32, 275-318.
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T. & Gosling, S. D. (2011).
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Perspectives on Psy-
chological Science, 6, 3–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1745691610393980
Clarke, V. A., Ruffin, C. L., Hill, D. J., & Beamen, A. L.
(1992). Ratings of orally presented verbal expressions
of probability by a heterogenous sample. Journal of
Applied Social Psychology, 22, 638-656. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1992.tb00995.x
Dhami, M. K., & Wallsten, T. S. (2005). Interper-
sonal comparison of subjective probabilities: To-
ward translating linguistic probabilities. Memory and
Cognition, 33, 1057–1068. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/
BF03193213
Ditto, H., & Jemmott, J. B. (1989). From rarity to eval-
uative extremity: Effects of prevalence information
on evaluations of positive and negative characteristics.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 16–
26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.1.16
Fiske, S. T. (1980). Attention and weight in person per-
ception: The impact of negative and extreme behavior.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 38, 889
- 906. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.38.6.889
Geurts, B. & Nouwen, R. (2007). At least et al.: The
semantics of scalar modifiers. Language, 83, 533-559.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/lan.2007.0115
Gourdon, A., & Beck, S., R. (2012). Overcoming the
framing effect when making decisions based on ver-
bal probabilities: Having more time is helpful but not
enough. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Harris, A. J. L., & Corner, A. (2011). Communicating
environmental risks: Clarifying the severity effect in
interpretations of verbal probability expressions. Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 37, 1571–1578. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1037/a0024195
Honda, H., & Yamagishi, K. (2006). Directional ver-
bal probabilities: Inconsistencies between preferen-
tial judgments and numerical meanings. Experimental
Psychology, 53, 161–170. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/
1618-3169.53.3.161
Jou, J., Shanteau, J., & Harris, R. J. (1996). An in-
formation processing view of framing effects: The
role of causal schemas in decision making. Memory
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 8, No. 3, May 2013 A pragmatic view of verbal probabilities 361
and Cognition, 24, 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/
BF03197268
Juanchich, M., Sirota, M., & Butler, C. L. (2012). The
perceived functions of linguistic risk quantifiers and
their effect on risk, negativity perception and decision
making. Organizational Behaviour and Human Deci-
sion Processes, 118, 72–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.obhdp.2012.01.002
Juanchich, M., Teigen, K. H., & Villejoubert, G. (2010).
Is guilt ‘likely’ or ‘not certain’? Contrast with previous
probabilities determines choice of terms. Acta Psy-
chologica, 135, 267–277. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
actpsy.2010.04.016
Juanchich, M., Sirota, M., Karelitz, T. & Villejoubert, G.
(2013). Can membership-functions capture the direc-
tionality of verbal probabilities?. Thinking and reason-
ing, 19, 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2013.
772538
Karelitz, T. M., & Budescu, D. V. (2004). You say
probable and I say likely: Improving inter-personal
communication with verbal probability phrases. Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 10, 25–41.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.10.1.25
Keren, G., & Teigen, K. H. (2001). Why is p = .90 better
than p = .70? Preference for definitive predictions by
lay consumers of probability judgments. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 8, 191–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.
3758/BF03196156
Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings. Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Lynn, M. (1991). Scarcity effects on value: A quantita-
tive review of the commodity theory literature. Psy-
chology and Marketing, 8, 43–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1002/mar.4220080105
Mandel, D. R. (2001). Gain-loss framing and choice:
Separating outcome formulations from descriptor for-
mulations. Organizational Behavior and Human Deci-
sion Processes, 85, 56–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/
obhd.2000.2932
Musolino, J. (2004). The semantics and acquisition of
number words: integrating linguistic and developmen-
tal perspectives. Cognition, 93, 1-41. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.cognition.2003.10.002
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Run-
ning experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Judg-
ment and Decision making, 5, 411–419.
Reyna, V. (1981). The language of possibility and prob-
ability: Effects of negation on meaning. Memory &
Cognition, 9, 642–650.
Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: How the questions
shape the answers. American Psychologist, 54, 93–
105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.2.93
Sher, S., & McKenzie, C. R. M. (2006). Information
leakage from logically equivalent frames. Cognition,
101, 467-494. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.
2005.11.001
Sirota, M., & Juanchich, M. (2012). To what extent do
politeness expectations shape risk perception? Even
numerical probabilities are under the spell! Acta Psy-
chologica, 141, 391–399. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
actpsy.2012.09.004
Teigen, K. H. (1988). The language of uncertainty. Acta
Psychologica, 68, 27–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
0001-6918(88)90043-1
Teigen, K. H., & Brun, W. (1995). Yes, but it is uncer-
tain: Direction and communicative intention of verbal
probabilistic terms. Acta Psychologica, 88, 233–258.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(93)E0071-9
Teigen, K. H., & Filkuková, P. (2013). Can > will: Pre-
dictions of what can happen are extreme, but believed
to be probable. Journal of Behavioral Decision Mak-
ing, 26, 68–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.761
Teigen, K. H., Juanchich, M., & Filkuková, P. (in press).
Verbal probabilities: An alternative approach. Quar-
terly Journal of Experimental Psychology. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2013.793731
Teigen, K. H., Juanchich, M., & Riege, A. (2013).
Improbable outcomes: Infrequent or extraordinary?
Cognition, 127, 119–139. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
cognition.2012.12.005
Theil, M. (2002). The role of translations of verbal into
numerical probability expressions in risk management:
A meta-analysis. Journal of Risk Research, 5, 177–
186. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669870110038179
Wallsten, T. S., Budescu, D. V., & Zwick, R. (1993).
Comparing the calibration and coherence of numerical
and verbal probability judgments. Management Sci-
ence, 39, 176–190. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.39.
2.176
Windschitl, P. D. & Wells, G. L. (1996). Measuring psy-
chological uncertainty: Verbal versus numeric meth-
ods. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Applied,
2, 343–364. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//1076-898X.2.
4.343
Appendix A. Vignettes and associated
distribution used in Experiment 1
Vignette 1: Computer batteries
A sample of computers of the brand “Comfor” was tested
to check how long the batteries last before they need to be
recharged. All computers were used by students for lec-
ture notes and similar purposes. The figure below shows
how many batteries lasted for how many hours (duration
is rounded to the nearest half hour).
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50
40
30
20
10
0
There are two incomplete sentences below. Please,
complete each sentence below with the number that
seems most natural in this context. You may also add one
of the suggested words (at least, around, at most or up to)
if you feel this could improve the sentence To complete
the sentence, drag and drop the items that you would like
to use from the list on the left into the box on the right.
It is certain [possible] that the battery will last
_______ _______.
at least
exactly
around
up to
1.5 hours
2 hours
2.5 hours
3 hours
3.5 hours
Vignette 2: Weight reduction
A weight reduction product ”Taremare” based on sea-
weed shows the following weight loss (in pounds) for a
sample of men and women adhering to the diet over a
period of three months.
18 lb16 lb14 lb12 lb10 lb
50
40
30
20
10
0
There are two incomplete sentences below. Please,
complete each sentence below with the number that
seems most natural in this context. You may also add one
of the suggested words (at least, around, at most or up to)
if you feel this could improve the sentence To complete
the sentence, drag and drop the items that you would like
to use from the list on the left into the box on the right.
By adhering to the Taremare program it is
certain [possible] that one will lose _______
_______.
at least
exactly
around
up to
10 pounds
12 pounds
14 pounds
16 pounds
18 pounds
Vignette 3: Jeans
A sample of jeans of the brand “Kenvelo” was machine
washed in the regular way and tested for shrinkage. The
figure below shows how much the jeans shrunk in length
(shrinkage is rounded to the nearest tenth of inch).
1.2 in1 in0.8 in0.6 in0.4 in
40
30
20
10
0
There are two incomplete sentences below. Please,
complete each sentence below with the number that
seems most natural in this context. You may also add one
of the suggested words (at least, around, at most or up to)
if you feel this could improve the sentence To complete
the sentence, drag and drop the items that you would like
to use from the list on the left into the box on the right.
It is certain [possible] that the Kenvilo jeans
will shrink _______ _______.
at least
exactly
around
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up to
0.4 inch
0.6 inch
0.8 inch
1 inch
1.2 inches
Appendix B. Vignettes and associated
distribution used in Experiments 2
and 3
Vignette 1: Computer batteries
“A sample of computers of the brand “Comfor” was
tested to check how long the batteries last before they
need to be recharged. All computers were used by stu-
dents for lecture notes and similar purposes. The figure
below shows how many batteries lasted for how many
hours (duration is rounded to the nearest half hour)”.
Experiment 1: Unimodal bar graph with five bars
accompanying the vignette showed a monotonically in-
creasing or decreasing distribution of durations, from 1.5
hours (5% or 40%) to 3.5 hours (40% or 5%), with inter-
mediate values: 2 hours (10% or 25%), 2.5 hours (20%),
3 hours (25% or 10%)
Experiment 2: Bimodal bar graph with five bars ac-
companying the vignette showed a U shaped distribution
of durations, with either a mode on the left or on the right.
For a left mode distribution, participants read the follow-
ing values: 1.5 hours (35%), 2 hours (10%), 2.5 hours
(10%), 3 hours (10%) and 3.5 hours (45%).
Based on these results, what is natural to say? Com-
plete the two sentences below in a way that seems natural
in this context:
It is certain that the battery in a Comfor computer will
last for . . . . . . hours
It is possible that the battery in a Comfor computer
will last for . . . . . . hours
Vignette 2: Weight reduction
“A weight reduction product ”Taremare” based on sea-
weed shows the following results for ten men and women
following the diet over a period of three months”.
Experiment 1: The results of ten individual dieters
were listed in a table with three columns: Weight before,
weight after and weight reduction (calculated as the dif-
ference between the first two values). For an increasing
distribution, weight loss ranged from 3 kg (one person)
to 9-10 kg (four persons), with 7 kg as the median value;
for a decreasing distribution four persons lost 3-4 kg and
only one lost 10 kg.
Experiment 2: Unimodal bar graph with four bars ac-
companying the vignette showed a U shaped distribution
of durations, with either a mode on the left or on the right.
For a left mode distribution, participants read the follow-
ing values: 10 lb (30%), 12lb (15%), 14lb (15%), and
16lb (40%).
The sentences to be completed were:
It is certain that with the Taremare program you will
lose . . . . . . lb
It is possible that with the Taremare program you will
lose . . . . . . lb
Vignette 3: Jeans
A sample of jeans of the brand “Kenvelo” was machine
washed in the regular way and tested for shrinkage. The
figure below shows how much the jeans shrunk in length
(shrinkages are rounded to the nearest half cm - 0.2 inch).
Experiment 1: An unimodal bar graph with five bars
showed a distribution of shrinkage from 1cm (10%) to 3
cm (35%), with as intermediate values: 1.5 cm (10%),
2 cm (20%), 2.5 cm (25%). (Percentages in parentheses
apply to increasing condition)
Experiment 2: An unimodal bar graph with five bars
showed a distribution of shrinkage from 0.4 inch (25%
or 45% as a function of the location of the mode) to 1.2
inch (45% or 25% as a function of the location of the
mode), with as intermediate values: 0.6 inch (10%), 0.8
inch (10%), 1 inch (10%).
The sentences to be completed were:
It is certain that Kenvelo jeans will shrink _____ in
after washing.
It is possible that Kenvelo jeans will shrink _____ in
after washing.
Vignette 4: Mail
(Experiment 1 only)
The postal services investigate how long it takes to
send a letter from Norway to various addresses in the US.
Ten letters are mailed on a regular Monday at 3 pm.
1 (4) letters arrives on Wednesday
2 (3) letters arrive on Thursday
3 (2) letters arrive on Friday
4 (1) letters arrive next Monday
The sentences to be completed were:
It is certain that a letter from Norway to USAwill take
_____ days.
It is possible that a letter from Norway to USA will
take _____ days.
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Vignette 5: Shmulp
(Experiment 2 only)
Please read the following vignette; don’t worry if you
do not understand the meaning of some words. Try to
complete the statement with the expression that sounds
most appropriate given the context.
Shmulps have a different number of glomps (glps).
The graph below shows to what extent a sample of
Shmulps is glomping. A bimodal bar graph with four
bars showed a distribution of shmulp from 1 glp (45% or
35%, as a function of the mode location) to 4 glps (35%
or 45%), with the intermediate values: 2 glps (10%), and
3 glps (10%).
The sentences to be completed were:
It is certain that a shmulp will have _____ glps.
It is possible that a shmulp will have _____ glps.
Appendix C. Vignettes used in Exper-
iment 4
Teacher
Imagine that Lea is a new teacher who will be the tutor of
a student this year. In Lea’s school, students are attending
three different programmes: 10% of the students attend
programme A, 20% attend programme B and 70% attend
programme C. Lea asks a colleague which programme
her tutee will attend, and the colleague responds:
“It is possible [entirely possible; not certain] that the
student will attend programme _____.”
Transport
Jane either goes to work by car, bus, or by bike. Her
husband says: “Jane goes to work by car 60% of the time,
by bus 30% and by bike 10%, so it is possible [entirely
possible; not certain] that tomorrow she will go to work
by _______.”
Car
Jason won a car on an internet lottery. He is wondering
about the colour of the car he won. Asked about that, the
secretary of the lottery company says: “5% of the cars are
white, 10% are red, 20% are grey and 65% are black, so
it is possible [entirely possible; not certain] that you will
have a _____ car”.
Shmulp
Please read the following vignette; no worry if you do
not understand the meaning of some words. Try to com-
plete the statement with the expression that sounds most
appropriate given the context.
There exist different types of shmulps. 10% are geler-
ing, 20% are laurding and 70% are glinpsing.
You wonder which kind of shmulp you will receive and
someone responds to you: “It is possible [entirely possi-
ble; not certain] that you will receive a ____ shmulp”.
